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Wednesday, August 03, 2005
A Dirty Bomb Attack Is Inevitable
Revisiting Hiroshima
By Noam Chomsky
08/02/05 "ICH" -- -- THIS month’s anniversary of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki prompts only the most sombre reflection and most fervent hope that the horror may never be repeated.
In the subsequent 60 years, those bombings have haunted the world’s imagination but not so much as to curb the development and spread of infinitely more lethal weapons of mass destruction.
A related concern, discussed in technical literature well before 9-11, is that nuclear weapons may sooner or later fall into the hands of terrorist groups.
The recent explosions and casualties in London are yet another reminder of how the cycle of attack and response could escalate, unpredictably, even to a point horrifically worse than Hiroshima or Nagasaki.
The world’s reigning power accords itself the right to wage war at will, under a doctrine of "anticipatory self-defence" that covers any contingency it chooses. The means of destruction are to be unlimited.
US military expenditures approximate those of the rest of the world combined, while arms sales by 38 North American companies (one in Canada) account for over 60 per cent of the world total (which rose 25 per cent since 2002).
There have been efforts to strengthen the thin thread on which survival hangs. The most important is the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which came into force in 1970. The regular five-year review conference of the NPT took place at the United Nations in May.
The NPT has been facing collapse, primarily because of the failure of the nuclear states to live up their obligation under Article VI to pursue "good faith" efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons. The United States has led the way in refusal to abide by the Article VI obligations. Mohamed El-Baradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, emphasizes that "reluctance by one party to fulfil its obligations breeds reluctance in others."
President Jimmy Carter blasted the United States as "the major culprit in this erosion of the NPT. While claiming to be protecting the world from proliferation threats in Iraq, Libya, Iran and North Korea, American leaders not only have abandoned existing treaty restraints but also have asserted plans to test and develop new weapons, including antiballistic missiles, the earth-penetrating ‘bunker buster’ and perhaps some new ‘small’ bombs. They also have abandoned past pledges and now threaten first use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states."
The thread has almost snapped in the years since Hiroshima, repeatedly. The best known case was the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, "the most dangerous moment in human history," as Arthur Schlesinger, historian and former adviser to President John F. Kennedy, observed in October 2002 at a retrospective conference in Havana.
The world "came within a hair’s breadth of nuclear disaster," recalls Robert McNamara, Kennedy’s defence secretary, who also attended the retrospective. In the May-June issue of Foreign Policy, he accompanies this reminder with a renewed warning of "apocalypse soon."
McNamara regards "current US nuclear weapons policy as immoral, illegal, militarily unnecessary and dreadfully dangerous," creating "unacceptable risks to other nations and to our own," both the risk of "accidental or inadvertent nuclear launch," which is "unacceptably high," and of nuclear attack by terrorists. McNamara endorses the judgment of William Perry, President Bill Clinton’s defence secretary, that "there is a greater than 50 per cent probability of a nuclear strike on US targets within a decade."
Similar judgments are commonly expressed by prominent strategic analysts. In his book Nuclear Terrorism, Harvard international relations specialist Graham Allison reports the "consensus in the national security community" (of which he has been a part) that a "dirty bomb" attack is "inevitable," and an attack with a nuclear weapon highly likely, if fissionable materials — the essential ingredient — are not retrieved and secured.
Allison reviews the partial success of efforts to do so since the early 1990s, under the initiatives of Sen. Sam Nunn and Sen. Richard Lugar, and the setback to these programmes from the first days of the Bush administration, paralysed by what Sen. Joseph Biden called "ideological idiocy."
The Washington leadership has put aside nonproliferation programmes and devoted its energies and resources to driving the country to war by extraordinary deceit, then trying to manage the catastrophe it created in Iraq. The threat and use of violence is stimulating nuclear proliferation along with jihadi terrorism.
A high-level review of the "war on terror" two years after the invasion "focused on how to deal with the rise of a new generation of terrorists, schooled in Iraq over the past couple years," Susan B. Glasser reports in The Washington Post. "Top government officials are increasingly turning their attention to anticipate what one called ‘the bleed out’ of hundreds or thousands of Iraq-trained jihadists back to their home countries throughout the Middle East and Western Europe. ‘It’s a new piece of a new equation,’ a former senior Bush administration official said. ‘If you don’t know who they are in Iraq, how are you going to locate them in Istanbul or London?"’
US terrorism specialist Peter Bergen says in The Boston Globe that "the president is right that Iraq is a main front in the war on terrorism, but this is a front we created."
Shortly after the London bombing, Chatham House, Britain’s premier foreign affairs institution, released a study drawing the obvious conclusion — denied with outrage by the government — that "the UK is at particular risk because it is the closest ally of the United States, has deployed armed forces in the military campaigns to topple the Taleban regime in Afghanistan and in Iraq ... (and is) a pillion passenger" of American policy, sitting behind the driver of the motorcycle. The probability of apocalypse soon cannot be realistically estimated, but it is surely too high for any sane person to contemplate with equanimity. While speculation is pointless, reaction to the threat of another Hiroshima is definitely not.
On the contrary, it is urgent, particularly in the United States, because of Washington’s primary role in accelerating the race to destruction by extending its historically unique military dominance.
Noam Chomsky is a professor of linguistics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the author, most recently, of Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global Dominance. ©2005 by Noam Chomsky
Posted at 05:38 pm by R7fel
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Old Enemies' Wargames Send a Powerful Message to the US
By Jane Macartney
Russia and China hope to sign a massive arms deal after staging joint exercises for the first time
RUSSIA will show off its most modern bombers to its best military customer and China will have a chance to demonstrate that it is a force to be reckoned with when the giant neighbours hold their first joint military exercises this month.
The decision to hold the drills off the east China coast in the Yellow Sea came after a disagreement over Beijing’s initial desire for the games to take place further south, opposite the island of Taiwan — which it hopes one day to recover, by force if necessary.
Yesterday’s announcement that 100,000 troops would mass from August 18 to 25 marked the culmination of years of rapprochement between countries that were once bitter enemies, which went to war in a minor territorial dispute in the 1970s, but now see themselves as strategic partners.
Their common interests include the sale of Russian oil to help to meet the energy needs of China’s fast-growing economy as well as the strategic goal of showing the United States that other powers were rising in the East.
History has enabled them to leave behind old enmities. Shi Yinhong, Professor of the School of International Studies at Renmin University, Beijing, said: “China needs to buy Russian military equipment and resources. For Russia, China is an important market and a source of hard currency.”
Peace Mission 2005, involving army, navy, air force, marine, airborne and logistics units, will begin on August 18 near the Russian Pacific Fleet headquarters in Vladivostok, moving to the Yellow Sea and then to an area off the Jiaodong peninsula in the coastal Chinese province of Shandong. “The exercises neither aim at any third party nor concern the interests of any third country,” the Chinese Defence Ministry said.
Russian paratroops will jump on to the peninsula, while Russian ships will engage in amphibious landing exercises.
Air force exercises involving Sukhoi Su27 fighter aircraft and Tupolev TU95MSs and TU22M-3s will round out the drills, with long-distance bombing runs and cruise missile attacks. The exercises could also involve China’s nuclear submarine fleet and antisubmarine warfare capability.
Analysts say there is little doubt that China is keen to send a message to the US. Not only is it gradually expanding its influence in Asia, eroding decades of dominance by Washington, but it also has the cash to go on a spending spree to update its military.
Russia’s TU160, TU95MS and TU22M3 strategic bombers and the improved Su27SM fighters will scream through the skies. It is not only their high-tech cockpits that Russia wants to show off. China may want to update its fleet of old, lumbering bombers with TU22M3s and TU95s capable of carrying long-haul nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. Russian nerves tingled when the European Union considered lifting its arms embargo on China earlier this year and since then Moscow has shown an interest in offering higher-technology arms to its top buyer.
The war games will involve a Russian airlift of an airborne unit to the training location by Il76 transport aircraft, launching a cruise missile to an imaginary target with TU22M3 medium-range bombers and bombing ground units with Su27SM fighters.
The two governments have invited observers from other governments in the six-nation Shanghai Co-operation Organisation, a security group led by Beijing and Moscow. The group, meant to combat separatism and Islamic extremism in Central Asia, includes Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.
The show of strength is enough to shake China’s neighbours, but may not go too far in tipping the balance of power in the Pacific. So China is relying on diplomacy as well to boost its influence, quietly eroding the pre-eminence of the United States in the process. Li Zhaoxing, the Chinese Foreign Minister, has had a helping hand recently from Condoleezza Rice, the US Secretary of State. She stayed away last week from an annual strategic forum involving the US, Japan and China in a meeting of South-East Asian nations. That left the stage to Mr Li, who dropped in to show Asia that China cared. The unspoken message was that Washington had seen fit to send only less-senior officials.
Vadim Solovyov, the Chief Editor of the Independent Military Survey, said: “These exercises are a challenge to the US and its allies — a new military alliance is forming. Now there is a unipolar world. Russia and China can make a second pole.”
Posted at 05:03 pm by R7fel
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03 August 2005
''The 'Great Game' Heats Up in Central Asia''
ussia and China delivered a one-two punch to Washington's ambitions in Central Asia on the eve of the G8 summit with a joint statement on "international order" followed by a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (S.C.O.) that was hostile to U.S. interests. While this combination was not enough to knock the U.S. out of the region, it was the most forceful challenge to U.S. interests in Central Asia since the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. [See: "Intelligence Brief: Shanghai Cooperation Organization"]
Seeking to prevent any further damage to Washington's position in the "Great Game," last week U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld traveled to the region to shore up support for maintaining its bilateral agreements with the key players. This was followed by Uzbekistan announcing a deadline for U.S. withdrawal from a military base in its territory. These moves indicate that even though fighting in Afghanistan has yet to cool down, the traditional power politics of Central Asia are heating up.
China and Russia Coordinate Their Central Asian Policies
Before the S.C.O. meeting, Russia's and China's leaders met at the Kremlin on July 1 to discuss their goals in Central Asia and the upcoming G8 summit. The meeting signaled a shift toward greater cooperation between the two states, completely solved their long-standing border disputes from the legal perspective, and laid the foundation for greater integration of their state-controlled oil companies and banking sectors. One reason that the atmosphere in the Kremlin was so unusually amiable was the perception that a shared threat loomed larger than their differences in policy goals; that threat was Washington's role in Central Asia.
The "Joint Statement of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation Regarding the International Order of the 21st Century," signed by Chinese President Hu Jintao and Russian President Vladimir Putin on July 2, addresses U.S. hegemony in several less-than-oblique passages. The text emphasizes "non-interference in internal affairs," "mutual respect" for other nations' "sovereignty," and stresses the role of "multipolarity" in dealing with conflicts.
In a passage aimed at Washington's perceived encroachment in Central Asia, the document states, "The peoples of all countries should be allowed to decide the affairs of their own countries, and world affairs should be decided through dialogue and consultation on a multilateral and collective basis. The international community should thoroughly renounce the mentality of confrontation and alignment, should not pursue the right to monopolize or dominate world affairs, and should not divide countries into a leading camp and a subordinate camp." This last statement could also easily be read as a preemptive dismissal of the G8 on the eve of the Scotland meeting. Though Russia is now a member and China an observer of the grouping, they feel that the organization is dominated by the West's agenda.
This dismissal of Western-style multilateralism is further expanded in a passing broadside aimed at the World Bank and the I.M.F. and their emphasis on reform in exchange for aid or loans: "The international community should establish an economic and trade regime that is comprehensive and widely accepted and that operates through the means of holding negotiations on an equal footing, discarding the practice of applying pressure and sanctions to coerce unilateral economic concessions, and bringing into play the roles of global and regional multilateral organizations and mechanisms."
Beijing and Moscow resent the West demanding economic reforms before further integrating China and Russia into the existing globalization power structures. They wish to present an alternative marketplace for developing countries to sell their goods -- one that does not tie economic access to reform or transparency. China has been able to successfully use the widely expected expansion of its domestic market to sell this alternative source of revenue to countries irked by the I.M.F. or World Bank, from South America to Africa. Now it hopes to further cement such a relationship with the states of Central Asia.
In the joint statement, China and Russia sent a clear message to the other members of the S.C.O. -- Washington poses a threat to Central Asia's sovereignty; China and Russia can offer a similar economic and security package, only it will be designed to preserve the current status quo not to encourage market economies or democratic reforms. Fearing future waves of "color" revolutions in the region, these states were eager to receive this message.
A Bigger and Stronger S.C.O.
On July 5, the members of the S.C.O. -- China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan -- met in Astana, Kazakhstan to discuss the changing political situation in Central Asia. While previous meetings focused nearly exclusively on the "three evil forces" -- terrorism, separatism and extremism -- and were dominated by China's desire to control the Uighur population in its Xinjiang region and protect its access to energy resources, this meeting demonstrated that the organization, which represents nearly 50 percent of the world's population when including members with observer status, desires to be a serious force in international affairs. This can be seen in the granting of observer status to India (at Russia's request), Pakistan (at China's insistence) and Iran (to the delight of all members).
The environment of the S.C.O. meeting was most influenced by the reaction to Uzbekistan's violent suppression of the May rebellion in Andijan. Western criticism of Uzbek President Islam Karimov's tactics brought to the surface the fears that the clan-based governments of Central Asia might fall in a wave of "color" revolutions, similar to that of Ukraine's "orange" revolution. Russia and China provided blanket support for Karimov after the suppression, while Washington could only offer nuanced criticism, fearing that intense criticism of Karimov would result in the loss of access to the Karshi-Khanabad air base, or K2, used to support U.S. operations in Afghanistan; nevertheless, the loss of this base now appears a likely scenario.
Washington's criticism was enough to spread fear throughout the ruling clans of Central Asia that the U.S. is engaged in covert operations to undermine or overthrow the current ruling regimes. This fear does not even escape Kyrgyzstan's subsequently elected government -- which swept into power in a similar manner as Ukraine's government -- because its support still rests on a shaky foundation of clan alliances.
In this environment, the S.C.O. sought to limit Washington's presence in the region -- Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan shifted their support to China and Russia in order to protect their sovereignty from U.S. meddling. The joint declaration issued at the end of the summit took aim at Washington by rejecting attempts at "monopolizing or dominating international affairs" and insisting on "non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states." The members further urged the U.S.-led forces in Afghanistan to declare a timetable for withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Uzbek and Kyrgyz bases in the region that were established to support the Afghan operations. The Central Asian states see it in their interests to fill the power vacuum that the withdrawals would create with that of China and Russia, which they believe would better ensure the longevity of their regimes.
Top U.S. General Richard B. Myers summed up Washington's interpretation of the shift in blunt terms: "It looks to me like two very large countries were trying to bully some smaller countries." Ten days later, Rumsfeld landed in Kyrgyzstan to ensure that the world's only superpower wasn't elbowed out of the region.
Washington Pushes Back
The U.S. secretary of defense's visit to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan was aimed at shoring up support for the continuation of the U.S. military presence in each country, which was successful at least for the mid-term. Kyrgyzstan hosts a U.S. military base at the Manas air base, and Tajikistan offers the U.S. military and N.A.T.O. fly-over rights and hosts a small contingent of French soldiers involved in Afghan operations. French Defense Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie was in Dushanbe on July 21 to firm up that arrangement. Notably, Rumsfeld did not visit Uzbekistan, the other S.C.O. member-state that hosts a U.S. military base. Whether his absence was the result of an Uzbek request or a calculation of Washington's, it demonstrated how the U.S. plans to address the shifting power relations in the region.
Washington has approached Central Asia on bilateral terms, never treating the S.C.O. members as a bloc. In terms of leverage in the relations, this shifts the fulcrum to Washington's advantage. China and Russia encourage the S.C.O. states to act multilaterally in an effort to limit Washington's reach. Rumsfeld's trip demonstrated Washington's ability to act bilaterally with Kyrgyzstan, which has a newly elected government and has yet to fully congeal its foreign policy, and Tajikistan, which has traditionally been the S.C.O. member that follows a balanced approach with its foreign suitors.
Recently, the relations between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have shown the strengths of Washington's bilateral approach. When over 500 Uzbeks crossed over into Kyrgyzstan following the crushing of protesters in Andijan, Kyrgyzstan initially reacted instep with the Uzbek government. Eighty-seven Uzbek refugees were sent back, prompting outrage from the U.N. and Washington. This led to negotiations between the U.N. and officials in Kyrgyzstan, which, by Washington's design, left out any avenue for input from Uzbekistan. On July 29, a plane with 440 Uzbek refugees left Kyrgyzstan for Romania. This demonstrated Washington's ability to directly influence the geopolitics of Central Asia only a few weeks after the united front presented by the S.C.O. called for a U.S. withdrawal.
However, in dealing with Karimov's government in Uzbekistan, Washington's bilateral approach is no longer effective, in part because of its success in Kyrgyzstan. The Uzbek suspicion of Washington's involvement in the Kyrgyzstan revolution and uprising in Andijan has caused Karimov to throw his government's support behind China's and Russia's vision for the region. As such, the same day that the plane carried refugees out of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan asked Washington to leave the K2 air base within 180 days. The immediate reaction from Washington was to hold back on sending a high-level representative to renegotiate the arrangement while waiting for things to "cool down."
This seems to suggest that the U.S. is leaning toward the future goal of regime change in Uzbekistan and is willing to sacrifice the air base if necessary. This does not mean that Washington will cut off all relations with Uzbekistan, but if it becomes apparent that future negotiations will not lead to an extension of the air base use agreement, Washington can be expected to pursue further bilateral agreements with the other governments in Central Asia to isolate Karimov's government.
Conclusion
Beijing, Moscow and Washington are once again using Central Asia, the setting for the "Great Game" between Tsarist Russia and Victorian England over 150 years ago, as their game board in a region rarely neglected by the world's great powers. In the contemporary version of the game, Washington approaches each state bilaterally, offering incentives to support the operations in Afghanistan while undermining the consensus put forth at the recent S.C.O. meeting.
China and Russia are acting in tandem to shore up support for S.C.O. policies by offering blanket support for the current regimes and implicitly calling attention to U.S.-led efforts to undermine their governments. The states hosting the game board will continue to swing their support from China and Russia to the U.S., and back again, so long as they keep their hold on power. The past month has seen a flurry of activity in the Great Game, and it can be expected that things will not cool down anytime soon.
Report Drafted By:
Adam Wolfe
The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an independent organization that utilizes open source intelligence to provide conflict analysis services in the context of international relations. PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader. This report may not be reproduced, reprinted or broadcast without the written permission of inquiries@pinr.com. All comments should be directed to content@pinr.com. |
Posted at 04:55 pm by R7fel
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Tuesday, August 02, 2005
The Iraq Infection
Matthew Herper, 08.02.05, 6:00 AM ET
Military doctors are fighting to contain an outbreak of a potentially deadly drug-resistant bacteria that apparently originated in the Iraqi soil. So far at least 280 people, mostly soldiers returning from the battlefield, have been infected, a number of whom contracted the illness while in U.S. military hospitals.
Most of the victims are relatively young troops who were injured by the land mines, mortars and suicide bombs that have permeated the Iraq conflict. No active-duty soldiers have died from the infections, but five extremely sick patients who were in the same hospitals as the injured soldiers have died after being infected with the bacteria, Acinetobacter baumannii.
"This a very large outbreak," says Arjun Srinivasan, a lieutenant commander in the U.S. public health service and a medical epidemiologist at the Centers for Disease Control.
Acinetobacter was the second most prevalent infection for soldiers in Vietnam, but the military did not expect to see it as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Researchers are still working to understand where it came from and how patients were infected. (See: "Military Chases Mystery Infection.")
Doctors worry not only about soldiers who are already infected but also those who are carrying Acinetobacter on their skin even though they themselves are not infected. Lt. Cmdr. Kyle Petersen, an infectious disease specialist at National Naval Medical Center (NNMC) in Bethesda, Md.,says his hospital treated 396 patients who had been wounded in Iraq between May 2003 and February 2005. About 10% were infected and another 20% were found to have Acinetobacter bacteria on their skin but were not infected. The rate of appearance of the bacteria has "been flat-out steady," says Petersen.
The same has been true at Army hospitals that include Walter Reed Medical Center in Washington, D.C., Tripler Medical Center inHawaii and Brooke Army Medical Center in San Antonio, where there has been a total of about 240 cases of patients infected, while another 500 have carried the bacteria, according to Col. Bruno Petrucelli, director of epidemiology and disease surveillance for the U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine.
Petrucelli says the five patients who died were at Army hospitals—most of them at Walter Reed. They were already suffering from serious health problems before they contracted the bacteria. "These were the sickest of the sick," says Petrucelli. The infections are split evenly among wound infections, respiratory infections and a mix of bloodstream and other infections.
Preventing the bacteria's spread has required doctors to take extreme care, putting all patients who are returning from the theater of war into isolation. "It's one of those pathogens that once it gets into a population and a chain of care, it can set up shop. Trying to contain the spread of this infection to other people is very difficult," says Andrew Shorr, a doctor who recently left Walter Reed for Washington Hospital Center. "What has happened over the past 18 months is every patient who shows up, we assume they're positive until they are demonstrated negative."
One of those infected in Iraq was Marine Cpl. Sean Locker. On July 10, he was attacked by a suicide bomber in a car while guarding a convoy. Shrapnel hit him in his nose, his right index finger and his right eye, blinding him. His left lung collapsed. But the worst damage was done to his left arm. It was amputated, and Locker says he knew it would be as soon as he looked down at it. "I tried to stay level-headed," he says.
Locker, 25, was flown to an army base in Landstuhl, Germany, and then to NNMC in Bethesda. There, doctors found that what was left of his arm after the amputation had been infected with Acinetobacter. For Locker, the prognosis was good, as two years of hard experience treating patients who had returned from war had taught doctors how to deal with the infection—and to prevent it from spreading to sicker patients. Using imipenem, one of three intravenous antibiotics effective against Acinetobacter, doctors are treating Locker's infection. He hopes to go home soon and buy a new truck.
But other patients have been less fortunate, as they have suffered from infections of the bone, the bloodstream or of internal organs, which have complicated their care. Lt. Cmdr. Petersen says that NNMC's annual bill for the kind of antibiotics Locker received has increased tenfold to $200,000.
Besides imipenem, which carries a risk of seizure, two other drugs have worked. Another is amikacin, which does not work for bone infections and has not been effective against some strains of the bacteria. A third is colistin, an antibiotic doctors had stopped using because of its toxic effects on the kidneys.
"It is a scary thing about any drug-resistant bacteria, when you grow it for the very first time out of a patient and you've only got three antibiotics, one so old that we had to bring it back from the archives," says Col. Joel Fishbain, chairman of the infection-control committee at Walter Reed.
The methods used by the military in dealing with Acinetobacter represent a model for preventing drug-resistant infections, which kill some 100,000 patients per year in the U.S.
Patients arriving are swabbed in the armpit and the groin. Until the cultures show they are negative, the soldiers are kept in isolation. Doctors and nurses make sure to wear gloves and gowns when coming into contact with them. At NNMC, the cost of gowns and gloves to help prevent infection has jumped 80% to $12,000, according to Petersen. Soldiers and their family members are not confined to the room, however—the main point is to keep doctors and nurses from spreading bacteria from one patient to another.
At NNMC, an added step has been taken by making sure infected and contaminated patients are kept in clusters of rooms separate from those who don't test positive for Acinetobacter.
A patient such as Locker might not even think much about Acinetobacter if the infection can be treated quickly and doesn't cause other problems. But some others feel they weren't given enough information about the bug—perhaps because military researchers themselves were still putting together answers.
Merlin Clark, a civilian contractor who was in Iraq doing humanitarian de-mining, was also infected with Acinetobacter and treated at Walter Reed, according to his wife, Marcie Hascall Clark. "My biggest problem," she says, "isn't so much that my husband had it, but why didn't they tell me about it?"
Posted at 10:25 pm by R7fel
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Sunday, July 31, 2005
| The Failed States Index |
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By FOREIGN POLICY & the Fund for Peace |
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About 2 billion people live in countries that are in danger of collapse. In the first annual Failed States Index, FOREIGN POLICY and the Fund for Peace rank the countries about to go over the brink.
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| America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones.” That was the conclusion of the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy. For a country whose foreign policy in the 20th century was dominated by the struggles against powerful states such as Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union, the U.S. assessment is striking. Nor is the United States alone in diagnosing the problem. U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan has warned that “ignoring failed states creates problems that sometimes come back to bite us.” French President Jacques Chirac has spoken of “the threat that failed states carry for the world’s equilibrium.” World leaders once worried about who was amassing power; now they worry about the absence of it. |
| Failed states have made a remarkable odyssey from the periphery to the very center of global politics. During the Cold War, state failure was seen through the prism of superpower conflict and was rarely addressed as a danger in its own right. In the 1990s, “failed states” fell largely into the province of humanitarians and human rights activists, although they did begin to consume the attention of the world’s sole superpower, which led interventions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. For so-called foreign-policy realists, however, these states and the problems they posed were a distraction from weightier issues of geopolitics. |
| Now, it seems, everybody cares. The dangerous exports of failed states—whether international terrorists, drug barons, or weapons arsenals—are the subject of endless discussion and concern. For all the newfound attention, however, there is still uncertainty about the definition and scope of the problem. How do you know a failed state when you see one? Of course, a government that has lost control of its territory or of the monopoly on the legitimate use of force has earned the label. But there can be more subtle attributes of failure. Some regimes, for example, lack the authority to make collective decisions or the capacity to deliver public services. In other countries, the populace may rely entirely on the black market, fail to pay taxes, or engage in large-scale civil disobedience. Outside intervention can be both a symptom of and a trigger for state collapse. A failed state may be subject to involuntary restrictions of its sovereignty, such as political or economic sanctions, the presence of foreign military forces on its soil, or other military constraints, such as a no-fly zone. |
| How many states are at serious risk of state failure? The World Bank has identified about 30 “low-income countries under stress,” whereas Britain’s Department for International Development has named 46 “fragile” states of concern. A report commissioned by the CIA has put the number of failing states at about 20. |
| To present a more precise picture of the scope and implications of the problem, the Fund for Peace, an independent research organization, and FOREIGN POLICY have conducted a global ranking of weak and failing states. Using 12 social, economic, political, and military indicators, we ranked 60 states in order of their vulnerability to violent internal conflict. (For each indicator, the Fund for Peace computed scores using software that analyzed data from tens of thousands of international and local media sources from the last half of 2004. For a complete discussion of the 12 indicators, please go to www.ForeignPolicy.com or www.fundforpeace.org.) The resulting index provides a profile of the new world disorder of the 21st century and demonstrates that the problem of weak and failing states is far more serious than generally thought. About 2 billion people live in insecure states, with varying degrees of vulnerability to widespread civil conflict. |
| The instability that the index diagnoses has many faces. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Somalia, state failure has been apparent for years, manifested by armed conflict, famine, disease outbreaks, and refugee flows. In other cases, however, instability is more elusive. Often, corrosive elements have not yet triggered open hostilities, and pressures may be bubbling just below the surface. Large stretches of lawless territory exist in many countries in the index, but that territory has not always been in open revolt against state institutions. |
| Conflict may be concentrated in local territories seeking autonomy or secession (as in the Philippines and Russia). In other countries, instability takes the form of episodic fighting, drug mafias, or warlords dominating large swaths of territory (as in Afghanistan, Colombia, and Somalia). State collapse sometimes happens suddenly, but often the demise of the state is a slow and steady deterioration of social and political institutions (Zimbabwe and Guinea are good examples). Some countries emerging from conflict may be on the mend but in danger of backsliding (Sierra Leone and Angola). The World Bank found that, within five years, half of all countries emerging from civil unrest fall back into conflict in a cycle of collapse (Haiti and Liberia). |
| The 10 most at-risk countries in the index have already shown clear signs of state failure. Ivory Coast, a country cut in half by civil war, is the most vulnerable to disintegration; it would probably collapse completely if U.N. peacekeeping forces pulled out. It is followed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Iraq, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Chad, Yemen, Liberia, and Haiti. The index includes others whose instability is less widely acknowledged, including Bangladesh (17th), Guatemala (31st), Egypt (38th), Saudi Arabia (45th), and Russia (59th). |
| Weak states are most prevalent in Africa, but they also appear in Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East. Experts have for years discussed an “arc of instability”—an expression that came into use in the 1970s to refer to a “Muslim Crescent” extending from Afghanistan to the “Stans” in the southern part of the former Soviet Union. Our study suggests that the concept is too narrow. The geography of weak states reveals a territorial expanse that extends from Moscow to Mexico City, far wider than an “arc” would suggest, and not limited to the Muslim world. |
| The index does not provide any easy answers for those looking to shore up countries on the brink. Elections are almost universally regarded as helpful in reducing conflict. However, if they are rigged, conducted during active fighting, or attract a low turnout, they can be ineffective or even harmful to stability. Electoral democracy appears to have had only a modest impact on the stability of states such as Iraq, Rwanda, Kenya, Venezuela, Nigeria, and Indonesia. Ukraine ranks as highly vulnerable in large part because of last year’s disputed election. |
| What are the clearest early warning signs of a failing state? Among the 12 indicators we use, two consistently rank near the top. Uneven development is high in almost all the states in the index, suggesting that inequality within states—and not merely poverty—increases instability. Criminalization or delegitimization of the state, which occurs when state institutions are regarded as corrupt, illegal, or ineffective, also figured prominently. Facing this condition, people often shift their allegiances to other leaders—opposition parties, warlords, ethnic nationalists, clergy, or rebel forces. Demographic factors, especially population pressures stemming from refugees, internally displaced populations, and environmental degradation, are also found in most at-risk countries, as are consistent human rights violations. Identifying the signs of state failure is easier than crafting solutions, but pinpointing where state collapse is likely is a necessary first step. |
Copyright 2005, The Fund for Peace and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved. FOREIGN POLICY is a registered trademark owned by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. |
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FOREIGN POLICY welcomes letters to the editor.
Readers should address their comments to fpletters@carnegieendowment.org. |
Posted at 11:53 am by R7fel
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World Not Set To Deal With Flu
Strategy for Pandemic Needed, Experts Say
By David Brown
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sunday, July 31, 2005; Page A01
Public health officials preparing to battle what they view as an inevitable influenza pandemic say the world lacks the medical weapons to fight the disease effectively, and will not have them anytime soon.
Public health specialists and manufacturers are working frantically to develop vaccines, drugs, strategies for quarantining and treating the ill, and plans for international cooperation, but these efforts will take years. Meanwhile, the most dangerous strain of influenza to appear in decades -- the H5N1 "bird flu" in Asia -- is showing up in new populations of birds, and occasionally people, almost by the month, global health officials say.
If the virus were to start spreading in the next year, the world would have only a relative handful of doses of an experimental vaccine to defend against a disease that, history shows, could potentially kill millions. If the vaccine proved effective and every flu vaccine factory in the world started making it, the first doses would not be ready for four months. By then, the pathogen would probably be on every continent.
Theoretically, antiviral drugs could slow an outbreak and buy time. The problem is only one licensed drug, oseltamivir, appears to work against bird flu. At the moment, there is not enough stockpiled for widespread use. Nor is there a plan to deploy the small amount that exists in ways that would have the best chance of slowing the disease.
The public, conditioned to believe in the power of modern medicine, has heard little of how poorly prepared the world is to confront a flu pandemic, which is an epidemic that strikes several continents simultaneously and infects a substantial portion of the population.
Since the current wave of avian flu began sweeping through poultry in Southeast Asia more than 18 months ago, international and U.S. health authorities have been warning of the danger and trying to mobilize. Research on vaccines has accelerated, efforts to build up drug supplies are underway, and discussions take place regularly on developing a coordinated global response.
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services will spend $419 million in pandemic planning this year. The National Institutes of Health's influenza research budget has quintupled in the past five years.
"The secretary or the chief of staff -- we have a discussion about flu almost every day," said Bruce Gellin, head of HHS's National Vaccine Program Office. This week, a committee is scheduled to deliver to HHS Secretary Mike Leavitt an updated plan for confronting a pandemic.
Despite these efforts, the world's lack of readiness to meet the threat is huge, experts say.
"The only reason nobody's concerned the emperor has no clothes is that he hasn't shown up yet," Harvey V. Fineberg, president of the National Academy of Sciences' Institute of Medicine, said recently of the world's efforts to prepare for pandemic flu. "When he appears, people will see he's naked."
Other scientists are sounding the alarm as well.
The most outspoken is Michael T. Osterholm, director of the Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy at the University of Minnesota. In writing and in speeches, Osterholm reminds his audience that after public calamities, the United States usually convenes blue-ribbon commissions to pass judgment. There will be one after a flu pandemic, he believes.
"Right now, the conclusions of that commission would be harsh and sad," he said.
In hopes of slowing a pandemic's spread, public health specialists have been debating proposals for unprecedented countermeasures. These could include vaccinating only children, who are statistically most likely to spread the contagion; mandatory closing of schools or office buildings; and imposing "snow day" quarantines on infected families -- prohibiting them from leaving their homes.
Other measures would go well beyond the conventional boundaries of public health: restricting international travel, shutting down transit systems or nationalizing supplies of critical medical equipment, such as surgical masks.
But Osterholm argues that such measures would fall far short. He predicts that a pandemic would cause widespread shutdowns of factories, transportation and other essential industries. To prepare, he says, authorities should identify and stockpile a list of perhaps 100 crucial products and resources that are essential to keep society functioning until the pandemic recedes and the survivors go back to work.
Deadly Potential
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Since late 2003, 109 people are known to have been infected with the emerging H5N1 virus in Asia. About half -- 55 -- have died.
Ironically, for the current H5N1 strain of avian flu to gain "pandemic potential," it will have to become less deadly. Declining lethality is a key sign that the microbe is adapting to human hosts. That is one reason the 34 percent mortality observed in the most recent outbreak -- a cluster of cases in northern Vietnam -- has scientists worried.
Pandemic influenza is not an unusually bad version of the flu that appears each winter. Those outbreaks are caused by flu viruses that have been circulating for decades and change slightly year to year.
Pandemics are caused by strains of virus that are highly contagious and to which people have no immunity. Such strains are rare. They arise from the chance scrambling and recombination of an animal flu virus and a human one, resulting in a strain whose molecular identity is wholly new.
In the 20th century, pandemics occurred in 1918, 1957 and 1968. Although the 19th-century record is less certain, there appear to have been four flu pandemics -- in 1833, 1836, 1847 and 1889. On a purely statistical basis, the nearly 40 years since the last one suggests the time may be ripe.
The microbe called influenza A/H5N1 appeared in East Asia in 1996 and has flared periodically since. It is highly contagious and lethal in chickens, but it can be carried without symptoms in some ducks -- a combination that helps keep it in circulation.
Birds occasionally infect humans, and scientists recently found evidence that the virus is sometimes passed person to person. That form of transmission is now difficult and rare, but the virus could evolve so that it becomes easy and common.
If H5N1 never becomes easily transmissible in human beings, it will never become a pandemic. If it does become transmissible, the consequences are difficult to imagine. But history provides some clues.
The "Spanish flu" in 1918 and 1919 was the biggest and, along with AIDS, the most important infectious disease outbreak of the 20th century. It is on the short list of great disasters in human history.
At least 50 million people, and possibly as many as 100 million, died when the world's population was 1.9 billion people, one-third its current size.
The Best Defense
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Tests are underway at three U.S. hospitals on an experimental vaccine against H5N1. But it is not the first H5N1 vaccine.
When a slightly different strain of the virus surfaced in Hong Kong in 1997, killing thousands of chickens and a half-dozen people, researchers used viruses from birds and people to make experimental vaccines. But neither offered much protection in lab tests, and nobody knows why.
Instead of working on the problem, researchers dropped it. First SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome), and then a different avian flu strain that arose in Europe (H7N7), took their attention.
"The urgency around this issue kind of dissipated," said John Treanor, a physician at the University of Rochester and one of the leaders of the vaccine project. "I think it's an example of how unpredictable things are. We got distracted."
The urgency is back.
As the first, small hedge against disaster, the government last fall ordered 2 million doses of H5N1 vaccine from Sanofi Pasteur, one of the country's three flu vaccine makers, even though nobody yet knows whether it works.
A half-dozen other countries are also working on pandemic vaccines. But making enough to fight an outbreak is a tall order.
About 300 million flu shots are made worldwide each year. The vaccine protects against three flu strains. If the global production capacity were directed to make only H5N1 vaccine, the output could be 900 million shots.
Unfortunately, virologists are almost certain people will need two doses about a month apart to mount a successful immune response against a wholly new strain such as H5N1. That would cut the theoretical number of recipients worldwide to 450 million. If each shot requires a larger-than-usual amount of vaccine to work, the number will be even smaller.
Can the world produce more flu shots? Not easily.
Because nearly all flu vaccine is made by growing the virus in fertilized chicken eggs, special factories and a steady supply of eggs are required. Consequently, a key element of pandemic planning is getting more people to get yearly flu shots, which will give companies a larger market and an incentive to expand their plants.
Around the world, flu vaccine production has risen by just one-third in the past decade. New plants in Brazil, South Korea and the Netherlands will boost global production by an additional 25 percent in the near future.
In theory, even a modest amount of vaccine might be useful. Fighting disease outbreaks is like fighting fires. You do not have to hose down the whole world to put the fire out, but you do have to hose down the perimeter to keep it from spreading. It might be possible to contain an H5N1 outbreak at its source if the surrounding population were immediately vaccinated.
Would the United States, Europe and Japan be willing to donate their precious vaccine supply to mount this long-shot defense? This is perhaps the biggest unanswered question in pandemic flu planning -- and one likely to be answered only at the moment of truth.
Officially, it is a possibility.
"If it was done in consultation with the WHO [World Health Organization] -- and with other governments that would make contributions, as well -- we would be more likely to consider it," said Gellin at HHS. But observers both in and out of the government said, not for quotation, that they doubt the U.S. government would ever send a significant amount of its vaccine stockpile overseas.
Only One Drug
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In the absence of a vaccine, the only pharmaceutical bulwark against H5N1 is oseltamivir. It can shorten the illness's duration, and if taken immediately after exposure, it can even prevent infection. But the world's supply of the drug is limited.
Sold as Tamiflu, it is manufactured by just one company, the Swiss giant Roche, in a laborious, expensive process that takes eight months.
Twenty-five countries have ordered oseltamivir to stockpile, and five others have expressed interest, a Roche spokesman, Terence J. Hurley, said recently.
The United States already has a stockpile, but it is enough to treat less than 1 percent of the population. The government has ordered enough to treat 3 million more people, or about 2 percent total.
At a congressional hearing in late May, the company's medical director, Dominick A. Iacuzio, said it will begin producing oseltamivir in the United States soon. The company says it could supply 13 million more courses of treatment in 2006 and an additional 70 million in 2007 -- provided the government orders them.
Would having lots of vaccine or oseltamivir make a difference?
In a study published last year, Ira M. Longini Jr. of Emory University ran a mathematical model of what might happen if a pandemic such as the 1957 Asian flu, which was caused by a virus far milder than bird flu, hit the United States.
He and his colleagues estimated that with no vaccine or antiviral drugs, there would be 93 million cases and 164,000 deaths. Vaccinating 80 percent of people younger than 19 -- the group most responsible for spreading the virus -- "would reduce the epidemic to just 6 million total cases and 15,000 total deaths in the country."
Giving that group eight weeks of oseltamivir would have the same effect, at least temporarily. But it would take the equivalent of 190 million courses of treatment -- more than anyone thinks the country will have in the next few years.
Somewhat more realistic is deploying the drug to where the outbreak begins. One researcher, Neil M. Ferguson of Imperial College in London, said in an interview that results of his not-yet-published mathematical modeling "are encouraging."
But unless antiviral drugs squelch a pandemic at the outset, their ultimate usefulness will be small. Without widespread immunity through vaccination or infection, the virus will simply move into a population when the drugs run out.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/30/AR2005073001429.html?referrer=email
Posted at 09:22 am by R7fel
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The Growing Importance of IT
The New Face of War: How War Will Be
Fought in the 21st CenturyBy Bruce Berkowitz. New York: Free Press, 2003. 272 pages.
Nicholas Negroponte, head of MIT’s Media Lab, observed that the information age is fast replacing atoms with bits; movies on film with packets on the Internet; print media with digital media; and wires with digital radio waves.
Negroponte does not apply the bits-for-atoms principle to warfare, but Bruce Berkowitz, in The New Face of War, does. According to Berkowitz, a senior analyst at RAND and a former intelligence officer, future wars will not be won by having more atoms (troops, weapons, territory) than an opponent, but by having more bits . . . of information.
Berkowitz argues that atoms that used to be big winners will become big losers to information technology. Reconnaissance sensors will quickly find massed troops, enabling adversaries to zap those troops with precision-guided weapons. Fortifications will tie armies down to fixed locations, making them sitting ducks for smart bombs. Cheap cyber weapons (e.g., computer viruses) will neutralize expensive kinetic weapons (e.g., missile defenses).
Berkowitz sums up the growing dominance of bits over atoms: “The ability to collect, communicate, process, and protect information is the most important factor defining military power.” The key word here is: “the most important factor.” The New Face of War gives many historical examples of information superiority proving to be an important factor in defining military power, such as the allies breaking German and Japanese codes during World War II and Union forces employing disinformation to mislead Confederates in the Civil War. But the digital revolution has transformed information from supporting actor to leading lady.
Evidence that this revolution has already occurred abounds. In the 1990 Gulf War, smart weapons turned Saddam’s strength (concentrated troops and tanks) into liabilities. More recently, al-Qa’ida used the global telecommunications net to coordinate successful attacks by small, stealthy groups who triumphed through information superiority (knowing more about their targets than their targets knew about them).
Perhaps the biggest effect of information technology on warfare will be the elimination of the concept of a front, according to Berkowitz. If fronts persist at all, they will live in cyberspace where info-warriors battle not over turf, but over control of routers, operating systems, and firewalls. Even so, The New Face of War argues that there will be no electronic “Pearl Harbors” on the emerging battlefield of bits because disabling a nation’s information technology (IT) infrastructure will be too hard even for the most sophisticated cyber-warriors. Well-timed, pinpoint computer network attacks will be much more likely.
Dr. Berkowitz’s vision of the future is probably right in many respects and off target in a few others. But, regardless of its accuracy, his book surfaces critical questions for the Intelligence Community.
First, the things he gets right and what these mean for intelligence: Information technology has changed warfare not by degree, but in kind, so that victory will increasingly go to combatants who maneuver bits faster than their adversaries. Thus, intelligence services will need an increasing proportion of tech-savvy talent to track, target, and defend against adversaries’ IT capabilities. As countries like China, India, Pakistan, and Russia grow their IT talent base—and IT market share—faster than the United States, the strengths of their intelligence services will likely increase relative to those of US intelligence.
Because cyber-wars will be played out on landscapes of commercial IT, intelligence agencies will need new alliances with the private sector, akin to existing relationships between nation states. And the Intelligence Community will have to confront knotty problems such as: performing intelligence preparation of cyber battlefields; assessing capabilities and intentions of adversaries whose info-weapons and defenses are invisible; deciding whether there is any distinction between cyber defense and cyber intelligence; and determining who in the national security establishment should perform functions that straddle the offensive, defensive, and intelligence missions of the uniformed services and intelligence agencies.
The growing importance of IT in warfare will also change the way intelligence agencies support atom-based conflicts. New technology will collect real-time intelligence for fast-changing tactical engagements, but the mainstay product of the Intelligence Community, serialized reports, is far too slow for disseminating these high-tech indications and warnings. Faster means of delivering—and protecting—raw collection must be devised, so that real-time intelligence can be sent directly to shooters without detouring through multiple echelons of military intelligence analysts. Also, remote sensors designed to report on the capabilities, intentions, and activities of armed forces, will not find lone terrorists. Radically new sensing networks that blanket the globe will be needed to collect pinpoint intelligence on individual targets.
The distinction between intelligence and tactical operations data (such as contact reports and significant activity reports) will blur as national intelligence means are focused on real-time tactical missions. All-source analysts will need to add tactical operations reporting to their diet of HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT, OSINT and MASINT.
Now, the areas in which The New Face of War misses the mark: First, military power in the future will not flow solely from precision zapping and deployment of small, networked forces. Some missions, such as peacekeeping, will always demand the highly visible presence of large forces. And if numbers do not matter anymore, as Berkowitz suggests, why worry about North Korea’s million-plus army? The bottom line is that as intelligence agencies get better at tracking and collecting on individuals terrorists, they will still need robust targeting and force protection capabilities against large conventional forces.
The evolution of media, with which we began this discussion, teaches powerful lessons about the folly of too quickly abandoning the old for the new. The printing press did not abolish handwriting; motion pictures did not kill live theater; television did not doom radio; and the Internet did not extinguish magazines. For each of these transitions from old to new, there were plenty of pundits who prophesized the demise of legacy forms of communication at the hands of new information technology.
Berkowitz is in good company, though. The US Air Force was so sure that close air combat was obsolete, that the first F-4 fighters did not have cannons. They relied instead on high-tech air-to-air missiles—until the F-4s fell victim to the cannons of North Vietnamese MIGs in “obsolete” air combat. Low-tech weapons on the F-4 ultimately did not yield to high-tech missiles; they simply moved over and made room for them. And today’s newest generation of fighters still retain cannons.
There is an important lesson here for intelligence agencies: As novel collection, analytic, and dissemination technologies are acquired, traditional tradecraft should be retained to cope with traditional adversaries and tactical situations. Just as missiles did not replace cannons, legacy tradecraft will need to be preserved but continuously improved to track changes in conventional warfare. For example, imaging satellites will always be essential, but they will have to steadily increase resolution and dwell time. Ditto for traditional SIGINT and MASINT collection systems.
I also disagree with Berkowitz’s contention that there can be no electronic Pearl Harbors. The inexorable migration to the Internet of such diverse functions as telephony, power plant control, commercial data networks, and defense communications has already created a “one-stop-shop” target for info-warriors. In essence, industrialized nations have done in cyberspace what Berkowitz says is so perilous in physical space: namely, concentrated all their eggs in one basket. Intelligence agencies should not, therefore, abandon the hope of severely crippling a cyber enemy, nor should they assume a cyber enemy could not return the favor.
Despite these shortcomings, The New Face of War is an eminently enjoyable read, jam-packed with fascinating historical examples of information technology at war. Dr. Berkowitz’s experience as an intelligence officer comes through clearly in his book, providing important context and relevance for intelligence collectors, analysts, and disseminators.
Put another way, whether consumed as atoms or bits, The New Face of War is a must read for all intelligence professionals.
Dr. Eric Haseltine is the Associate Director for Research at the National Security Agency. This article is unclassified in its entirety.
Posted at 08:57 am by R7fel
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Friday, July 29, 2005
The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War
Fight Makes Right?
A conservative writer unmasks the perils of unchecked American militarism.
by Norman Kelley - July 28, 2005
The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War
by Andrew Bacevich
Oxford University Press, 270 pp.
$28
Perhaps it's too strong to argue that America is no longer a republic. Let's say, then, that it is now a pro forma democratic republic. It has the form of republicanism--representative government, a written constitution, elections--but power is increasing held in the hands of self-perpetuating oligarchs whose own political agents are now developing dynasties: Kennedy, Bush, Clinton, etc. Even at the local level, we can observe how politicians are bequeathing to their sons and daughters their political positions via the family name.
In the Cold War era, America's morphing into something other than the land of the free was an issue mostly of concern to the left. But now conservatives--people who favor strong national defense, small government, and budgetary restraint--are becoming increasingly concerned that the Bush administration's "war on terror," and especially the gambit in Iraq, has taken us, who in the Soviet era fancied ourselves the anti-imperialists, into the realm of what historian Niall Ferguson calls the "imperialism of anti-imperialism."
To say the least, the 9/11 attacks caused much anxiety in the American population. Indoctrinated with the news that America was the greatest nation on earth--in history!--and blessed with God's providence, rather than understanding that al Qaeda was motivated, in part , by U.S. foreign policy, Americans simply applauded as the military was sent into Afghanistan. Then, deciding that the next move was into Iraq, numerous neocon apparatchiks in the Bush administration dusted off plans that had sat on the shelf since the Clinton administration, and on we rolled. Bush decided that regime change was in order, but not necessarily based on any real criteria for defending American security--say, weapons of mass destruction--but so we could export American democracy, American values.
But how does one go about exporting American values? As Andrew J. Bacevich argues in his new book, you do it via the new American militarism. In the view of this conservative, Americans have become a nation of "Wilsonians under arms," believers in liberal democracy and free enterprise, who feel that American principles are "the principles of mankind and must prevail."
In The New American Militarism , Bacevich, a graduate of West Point, a Vietnam veteran, and a professor of international relations at Boston University, examines the use of force by the U.S. military and how Americans have been "seduced by war." It's a crisply written, nuanced book that looks at the multiplicity of factors that has led the United States to become a militaristic society.
The old Clausewitzian notion of war being a policy continued by other means has been turned on its head. In its place: Whatever the policy, use the military to execute it. This has led to the fraying of international relations and the creation of humanitarian crises, all while evoking the mythos of the American fighting man to buck up the nation.
Bacevich doesn't see this new militarism as something cooked up in back rooms but as a series of conceived ideas, unacknowledged plans of action, incoherent policies and unintended consequences. And each Democratic and Republican administration contributed to it, some more than others. The roots of America's seduction by war lie in the military, especially the American military's defeat in Vietnam. In the army's eyes, the problem was that civilian leadership encroached into their field of expertise, warfare. Soldiers were executing policies not of their making.
(That, of course, is the way our government works: We have civilian leadership over the military so we can fire the commander-in-chief without fear of a coup d'état.)
Following Vietnam, the Army began crafting policies meant to guarantee, for any military entanglement, clear missions, exit strategies, and the capability of using overwhelming force. It had already, by way of Nixon, ended the draft, kicked out its miscreants and begun rebuilding itself. Previous to Nixon's decree, General Creighton Abrams had made sure that any use of force in future engagement would also include the use of National Guardsmen and reservists. This was a response to the Joint Chiefs of Staff's advocating that Johnson call up the reserves for Vietnam. Johnson wouldn't bite, since doing so would have meant that the nation was moving to a war footing, and Johnson, wanting both guns and butter in his Great Society programs, wanted to "keep the war small."
One of the ironies of the army's new policy was that even as it sought to restore its relationship with the American citizenry, the government scuttled the one mechanism that had made military service universal, if not democratic: the draft. Now the country, in relying on citizen soldiers, no longer shares a collective sense of sacrifice. Moreover, Bacevich argues, the nation's elite is less represented in the military than ever before. This makes going to war easier and more of an abstraction for those who plan the nation's grand imperial schemes or cheerlead from the sidelines.
Americans now rely on the military to represent national virtues that the nation as a whole has tossed aside. The military, in Bacevich's view, is the "national icon, the apotheosis of all that it is great and good about contemporary America." This demands that Americans "support the troops"--even if they are caught torturing prisoners of war, and even when no high-ranking military official is held accountable for the actions of these troops.
No "political figure of genuine stature" challenges the drift of the nation into militarism, a phenomenon the author finds deeply troubling. He writes:
"Few in power have openly considered whether valuing military power for its own sake or cultivating permanent global superiority might be at odds with American principles. Indeed, one striking aspect of America's drift toward militarism has been the absence of dissidence offered by any political figure of genuine stature. Members of the political class, Democrats and Republicans alike, have either been oblivious to the possibility that something important might be afoot or else have chosen to ignore the evidence."
A good example of Bacevich's point can be found in the March 21, 2005, edition of the New Yorker , in which Jeffrey Goldberg's "The Unbranding" looks at the phenomenon of what he calls "national security Democrats."
These are Democrats--Hillary Clinton, Joseph Biden, John Edwards, Evan Bayh, Bill Richardsonwho feel the need to "market" themselves as just as bellicose as the Republicans, regardless of the fact that such a posture has nothing to do with truly protecting the security of the United States, or, for that matter, understanding the limits of force. John Kerry argued that he could better manage the war in Iraq, not whether the U.S. should have been there to begin with. The more the nation becomes obsessed with security, the less secure it finds itself, and the more willing it becomes to toss aside its tradition of civil liberties.
But to voice such would be politically suicidal. And the neocons, as Bacevich points out, have been very good at skewering those Democrats who think there may be better ways to export American values than through war.
It took about 15 years for the military to rebuild itself, a timeline spanning the mid-'70s to the first Gulf War. Reagan pushed the process forward when he significantly beefed up defense expenditures in the 1980s. The military wanted to get away from the kind of counterinsurgency war that it didn't like to fight like in Vietnam, and it concentrated on looking at a battle in Europe against the Soviet Union.
The Gulf War, with its smart bombs and light casualties, returned the American fighting man to the public's esteem and made Colin Powell and Norman Schwarzkopf folk heroes. Herein lies an unintended consequence on the road to militarism: The new can-do military was called upon to can-do everything that it was not equipped to handle or solve--Haiti and Somalia, for example.
In the wake of big wars, Americans had traditionally demobilized the armed forces and kept no large standing armies. But that was a quaint tradition, from a society that prided itself on being a republic, not an empire. Americans now have a decision to make: return to their republican heritage or embrace empire as a way of life. Bacevich's book shines a rare, illuminating light, trying to lead the nation out of a dark forest before it trips and falls into an abyss that it can't climb out of.
kelleynd@aol.com
Posted at 08:36 pm by R7fel
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Wednesday, July 20, 2005
China Poses An Aggressive Military Threat
China Build Up Could Mean Threat To U.S.
By Pamela Hess
Jul 20, 2005, 19:00 GMT
WASHINGTON, DC, United States (UPI) -- The Pentagon released Tuesday the long-awaited annual Chinese military power report, painting a picture of a nation bent on building up its military and learning the technological lessons of the U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
China`s primary military focus remains Taiwan, specifically its interest in forcing the island nation to reunite with mainland China.
\"It`s a very straightforward description of ... a significant military buildup that`s been taking place,\" U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said Monday.
China has arrayed most of its most advanced weaponry and highly trained personnel across southeast China, postured to prevent Taiwan independence or \"to compel Taiwan to negotiate a political settlement on Beijings terms,\" the report states.
It includes an expanding force of ballistic missiles, both long and short range, cruise missiles, submarines, and advanced aircraft.
While China`s focus is now Taiwan, the Pentagon report notes that China`s military could easily pose \"a credible threat to other modern militaries operating in the region\" if it continues its build up.
\"The pace and scope of China`s military build-up are, already, such as to put regional military balances at risk. Current trends in China`s military modernization could provide China with a force capable of prosecuting a range of military operations in Asia -- well beyond Taiwan.\"
For now, however, the report says China has only limited abilities to project convention military power beyond its borders. The People`s Liberation Army is buying new weapon systems and writing new doctrine, however, that could take it well beyond China`s shores.
\"In the future, as China`s military power grows, China`s leaders may be tempted to resort to force or coercion more quickly to press diplomatic advantage, advance security interests, or resolve disputes,\" the report warns.
Publicly, however, Beijing adopts a posture of non-confrontation, saying it wants to develop China`s economic power and supports a policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. China also has a \"no-first-use\" nuclear policy.
Last week a Chinese general told reporters that if the United States drew its forces within striking distance of Chinese territory in an attempt to defend Taiwan, the country should use nuclear weapons against American forces.
The officer, Maj. Gen. Zhu Chenghu, is an instructor at China`s national defense university and said he was expressing his personal opinion only.
China, however, is investing in its strategic nuclear missile force, both in numbers and capabilities.
\"It is fielding more survivable missiles capable of targeting India, Russia, virtually all of the United States, and the Asia-Pacific theater as far south as Australia and New Zealand.\"
It has about 20 nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles and about 20 medium-range missiles to counter regional threats.
China is also investing in space forces. In 2004 alone it launched 10 satellites into orbit and hopes to have more than 100 satellites in orbit by 2010.
At the same time it plans to field an anti-satellite laser.
\"The Defense Intelligence Agency believes Beijing eventually could develop a laser weapon capable of damaging or destroying satellites,\" the report states.
The Pentagon for its part is focusing a large measure of its ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review deliberations on the threat posed by China and the possibility of having to fight a conventional or nuclear war against the country.
The task of deciding what U.S. forces will be needed to counter or dissuade a Chinese threat is made more complicated by the fact that the U.S. government has no idea exactly how much China is investing in its military. In March, a Chinese government spokesman announced China would increase its \"publicly disclosed-defense budget\" in 2005 by 12.6 percent, to approximately $29.9 billion, double the amount it spent in 2000.
\"When adjusted for inflation, the nominal increases have produced double-digit actual increases in China`s official defense budget every year since the mid-1990s. However, the officially published figures substantially underreport actual expenditures for national defense,\" the Pentagon report states.
The report estimates that all told, China could be spending $90 billion in 2005 on military accounts, making it the third largest defense budget in the world. It is dwarfed by the U.S. defense budget at $420 billion.
Speaking at the Pentagon Monday, Australian Prime Minister John Howard told reporters he doesn`t believe China poses an aggressive military threat because of its keen interest in economic growth.
\"I think that China is a country that is growing in power and economic strength, but understands that military conflict of any kind is not conducive to her medium- and longer-term goals,\" Howard said.
The Defense Intelligence Agency believes China`s leaders recognize \"that a war could severely retard economic development.\" Tawain is China`s single largest source of foreign direct investment.
The report also warns of \"serious and numerous\" consequences if the European Union lifts the arms embargo it has had in place against China since the 19898 Tiananmen Square crackdown.
It would significantly improve China`s access to military and dual use technologies; expertise in doctrine and training, and allow China to set up joint vetnrues with European companies to improve its space, radar, early-warning aircraft, submarine technology and electronics for precision guided munitions.
It would also give China, as a major new customer for weaponry, economic leverage over Russia, Israel and other countries to expand the number of systems they will sell to Beijing.
\"Such an acceleration of China`s military modernization would have direct implications for stability in the Taiwan Strait and the safety of U.S. personnel; it would also accelerate a shift ion the regional balance of power, affecting the security of many countries,\" the report states.
Lifting the embargo would also give China more technology and advanced weaponry to transfer or sell to countries of concern, including Burma, Sudan and Zimbabwe.
Copyright 2005 by United Press International
© Copyright 2003 - 2005 by monstersandcritics.com.
Posted at 04:59 pm by R7fel
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A Perfect Authoritarian Storm
Orwell Meets Kafka
By Robert Kuttner | July 20, 2005
THE OTHER DAY, the new secretary of homeland security, Michael Chertoff, scrapped the moronic rule requiring everyone to stay seated for 30 minutes coming in or out of Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport.
The premise of the rule, enacted after 9/11, was that if everyone remained in their seats, it would be illegal for a terrorist to rush the cockpit. Apparently, it didn't occur to the genius who wrote the order that only law-abiding citizens would obey. It's a perfect, if small, example of the idiocy of unchecked state power.
Chertoff did not change the rule because some open evidentiary process required him to but because he felt like it. As an immensely powerful official in an increasingly authoritarian age, he did it as a regal act of noblesse oblige: In my majesty/ I now decree/ the people are free/ to go and pee.
As his reason for granting relief, so to speak, Chertoff disingenuously declared that security conditions had improved. This was the week of the London bombings. But, as a high official, he was not about to admit that the rule had been dumb all along. National security bureaucrats don't make mistakes.
It's a small example of a terrible trend -- the relentless accumulation of arbitrary authority and the slow erosion of liberties.
Countless recent news stories have one thing in common -- denial of rights.
A British-born pilot for Cape Air is denied the right to take a course to qualify him to fly larger planes as a security risk. No evidence is offered.
The Bush administration reasserts its right to torture and hold indefinitely prisoners at Guantanamo, on the premise that it is part of Cuba (tell that to Castro!) where presumably totalitarian rules rather than American rules apply -- even though the United States runs the place.
A distinguished and moderate Muslim British educational leader is denied entry at the US border, en route to a conference discussing religious reconciliation and healing. No reason is given.
Immigrants attending required classes on worker safety find that the safety agency is doing the bidding of the immigration police. They can be detained indefinitely if the country of their birth won't admit them, even if they came here as infants.
The administration reasserts that citizens as well as immigrants can be detained indefinitely as security risks.
Congress is on the verge of reauthorizing the misnamed USA Patriot Act with only very modest refinements of its worst features.
Governors complain that Congress rushed through a national ID law with little concern for cost or privacy.
If the American republic was built on any core principle, that principle is the rights of people to be free from the abuses of unchecked power. The Constitution's framers gave those rights not to ''citizens" but to ''persons." In America, everyone enjoys basic rights.
Or once did.
In America, certain practices are not permitted -- in any context. We have the right to confront accusers and know the charges. We cannot be arbitrarily detained indefinitely. Trials must be speedy and public. We may speak freely without political retribution.
Now there is a perfect authoritarian storm -- a genuine terrorist threat coupled with an administration that disdains the Constitution and will soon control all three branches of government. As a pretext for arbitrary rule, we have the premise of permanent warfare predicted by Orwell combined with the unchallengeable denial of rights described by Kafka.
Some rights are subject to fair debate -- how much religious symbolism in the public square? What rights, if any, for the unborn? How far to take affirmative action? But far more venerable and fundamental rights are now under assault.
Left and right are bitterly divided today. But if there is one issue that unites nearly all liberals with principled conservatives, it's that we must resist the assault on precious rights. In exploring the views of proposed Supreme Court nominees, the Senate should give the issue of rights priority above all others, since the courts are the last bastion of our freedoms.
There's one more recent news story worthy of special note. The American Civil Liberties Union, the one organization whose entire purpose is to defend rights, finds that the FBI has assembled more than 1,000 pages of files on it as a possible security risk. These files, of course, are classified, in the name of national security. Orwell, meet Kafka.
I'm donating the fee for this column to the ACLU, and everyone who cares about liberty should join it. Look at ACLU.org, or write ACLU, 125 Broad St., New York, NY 10004.
Robert Kuttner, co-editor of The American Prospect, can be reached at kuttner@prospect.org. His column appears regularly in the Globe. 
© Copyright 2005 Globe Newspaper Company.
Posted at 04:14 pm by R7fel
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